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The New Capital Requirements Directive 
What pieces are still missing from the puzzle? 
Rym Ayadi* 
 
Introduction 
After almost seven years of hard work to produce 
a new substantive piece of legislation updating 
the current banking regulation for European 
credit institutions and investment firms – the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) – it looks 
like its timely adoption is still uncertain. The 
main problem is the dissatisfaction of 
Parliament with its limited role in comitology 
and in the Lamfalussy process, which has led it 
to suspend ‘temporarily’ the comitology 
provisions of the CRD, casting doubt over the 
future ability to amend the legislation. The 
European Constitution addresses Parliament’s 
concern about ensuring democratic 
accountability in the comitology process in 
Art. 36. The pause for reflection on the 
Constitution prompted by the no-votes in the 
French and Dutch referenda has re-ignited the 
issue and is forcing EU institutions to seek a 
new inter-institutional agreement on this issue.  
As a result, one undesirable scenario could 
materialise concerning the adoption of the new 
Directive. Unless a formal inter-institutional 
agreement is reached with respect to 
comitology, there is a high risk that the CRD 
will be unduly pushed towards a second 
reading, which in turn puts a question mark 
over its timely implementation. Adding to the 
complexity of the puzzle, the treatment of 
trading-book activities and double-default 
effects in the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel 
II) is to be incorporated into the new Directive 
as an amending package, without the opportunity 
to renegotiate any of its aspects.  
In addition to the heated issue of comitology, the 
first reading by Parliament gave rise to several 
other issues including the level of application, the 
lead supervisor, the intra-group exposure and the 
disclosure of ratings. During the parliamentary 
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process, several special interest groups persisted in 
negotiating for their specific aims. Yet the outcome from 
such lobbying may risk undermining one of the main 
goals of the Directive, which is to ensure a level playing 
field.  
The objectives of this Policy Brief are threefold: first, it 
examines the role of the European Commission in the 
CRD legislative process; second, it identifies the main 
scenarios expected in the adoption episode; and third, it 
offers recommendations with respect to some outstanding 
issues in the key provisions of the forthcoming Directive.  
The role of the European Commission in the 
CRD process 
Since the Basel Committee began to revise the capital 
adequacy framework for internationally active banks in 
1999, the European Commission has been deeply 
involved and committed to updating the current EU 
banking rules to keep pace with market developments. 
Following several years of sustained effort and shortly 
after the issuance of the Basel II text, the Commission 
finally produced a major legislative proposal.  
In June 2004, the Basel Committee produced a fairly 
advanced version of a broader and more substantive 
regulatory framework for internationally active banks that 
aims at underpinning banking solvency. The same 
framework served as a background document for the 
Commission to update the current EU banking regulation. 
In July 2004, a proposal for an updated CRD was 
published, which has largely retained the same provisions 
introduced in the Basel II text, but with some variations to 
accommodate the EU context.  
Although Basel II was originally intended to be applied 
by internationally active banks, the Directive will target – 
when adopted – all credit institutions and investment 
firms irrespective of their size, scope of activities or level 
of sophistication. This scope of application is highly 
challenging since it should be made appropriate for small, 
medium-sized and large banks as well as investment firms 
on the grounds that they carry out similar activities and 
risks. This approach is laudable, since it encourages all 
types of EU financial institutions to upgrade their internal 
systems, resulting in a more risk-sensitive management of 
their activities in the future. Moreover, it pays close 
attention to the level-playing-field principle since EU 
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banks and investment firms need to be subject to 
equivalent regulations on the grounds that they bear the 
same risk.  
In order to smooth the transition to the new regulatory 
framework of such a large population of financial 
institutions varying in size and sophistication and to make 
risk-sensitivity achievable by all of them, the Commission 
introduced some EU-specific solutions by: 
•  creating ‘roll-out’ rules for the internal rating-based 
(IRB) approaches that allow credit institutions to 
move different business lines and exposure classes to 
the foundation or the advanced IRB approach (Art. 
85);  
•  allowing small and medium-sized banks to partially 
use the IRB approaches for some exposures 
combined with the continued use of the standardised 
approach for exposures to sovereigns and financial 
institutions (Art. 89); 
•  giving preferential treatment (lower capital charges as 
compared with the original Basel II text) to private 
equity and venture capital investments when these are 
considered as “sufficiently diversified” (Annexes VI 
and VII);  
•  providing special treatment to covered bonds (Annex 
VI); and  
•  exempting small investment firms from the new 
operational risk charges, reflecting their risk profile 
and limited systemic importance. 
Further, it called for enhanced convergence of regulatory 
and supervisory practices aimed at creating a single EU 
financial market. To this end, some actions have already 
been taken to prepare the ground for the successful 
implementation of the new CRD in the EU. The creation 
of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) under the comitology structure specified by 
Commission Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 is 
intended not only to enhance the cooperation and the 
exchange of information between national supervisors to 
increase the effectiveness of supervision in a cross-border 
context, but also to help incorporate updates and technical 
changes more easily under the comitology procedure.  
Hence, the role of the CEBS is crucial in promoting 
supervisory convergence and disclosure, given the 
enhanced supervisory discretion introduced by pillar 2 of 
the new Basel Capital Accord. The CEBS is also 
responsible for providing criteria for national supervisors 
to validate the IRB models for credit risk and the 
advanced measurement (AM) models for operational risk, 
along with the requirements of the statistical data to be 
provided by the banks. This ongoing task is certainly 
burdensome and demanding, because it will have to seek 
a theoretical and probably non-existent balance between 
diversity and convergence. Diversity is a result of cultural 
and legal differences between the member states, while 
the drive for convergence through new legislation relates 
to the major opportunity to promote a level playing field 
among credit institutions and investment firms across the 
EU and ultimately to achieve an integrated financial 
market. Therefore, the key success factor for the EU in its 
implementation of the CRD is to construct a solid, 
cooperative system in banking supervision to spread 
supervisory best practices throughout the member states. 
At the same time, the Commission proposal is being 
expanded to incorporate additions to the Basel II 
framework (finalised in June 2004) that have been 
proposed by the joint Working Group of the Basel 
Committee and the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO) under its review of 
trading book
2 issues and the treatment of double-default
3 
effects. Because the time frame for the adoption of the 
Directive is tight, the Commission is seeking to introduce 
the new Basel rules on trading activities and the treatment 
of double-default effects as a package of amendments in a 
European Parliament plenary session in September 2005, 
which is a very unusual measure. This was inevitable, 
however, since the final rules were only finalised by the 
international regulators as recently as 18 July 2005 and 
time is running out.  
Since the beginning of the process to revise the capital 
requirement rules, the Commission has followed a very 
flexible approach and has ensured public consultation at 
every step of the way. Nevertheless, in this author’s view, 
its role in the process has suffered from several 
weaknesses.  
First, the Commission has produced a substantive EU 
legislative text by reference to the Basel II framework but 
at no time has it explicitly indicated the main differences 
                                                        
2 The definition of ‘trading book’ is given in para. 685 of the 
revised framework (June 2004): “A trading book consists of 
positions in financial instruments and commodities held 
either with trading intent or in order to hedge other elements 
of the trading book. To be eligible for trading book capital 
treatment, financial instruments must either be free of any 
restrictive covenants on their tradability or able to be hedged 
completely. In addition, positions should be frequently and 
accurately valued, and the portfolio should be actively 
managed” (italics added for emphasis). In the CRD proposal, 
this is defined in Art. 11 of the re-cast version of Directive 
93/6/EEC. The definition of trading intent criteria is more 
precisely given in para. 687 of the revised framework: 
“Positions held with trading intent are those held 
intentionally for short-term resale and/or with the intent of 
benefiting from actual or expected short-term price 
movements or to lock in arbitrage profits, and may include 
for example proprietary positions, positions arising from 
client servicing (e.g. matched principal broking) and market 
making.” In the CRD proposal, the trading intent criteria are 
defined in Annex VII, part A.  
3 Double-default stems from the risk of both the borrower 
and the guarantor defaulting on the same obligation; see the 
report on revised rules to trading activities and double-
default effects by the Bank for International Settlements 
(2005b). THE NEW CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS DIRECTIVE | 3 
 
between the Basel text and the EU one
4. Such a 
comparison would have eased the task of Parliament, 
industry representatives and other observers in 
understanding the two sets of rules. As yet, the exact 
differences are not thoroughly identified and the 
deviations from the original text are not sufficiently 
explained.  
Cost-benefit analyses or targeted impact studies could 
have been provided to gauge the impact of the proposed 
specific ‘EU’ measures on financial institutions and 
across business lines.  
The fact that the drafters of the EU text have relied on the 
results of the Basel Committee’s and the European 
Commission’s third Qualitative Impact Studies (QIS-3) 
published in year 2003 should not necessarily inspire 
confidence since the results of the QIS-3 have proven to 
be insufficiently reliable to enable final conclusions to be 
drawn.
5 Moreover, these results do not take into account 
the impact that the new trading book rules has on the 
required levels of capital for banks and investment firms. 
Additional impact studies will be required to gauge the 
effects of the new rules on credit institutions and 
investment firms on the one hand and on financial 
stability on the other. 
Second, among the three alternatives for updating the 
existing banking legislation (amending, re-casting or 
developing a new directive), the Commission has 
preferred the re-cast technique,
6 since it not only retains 
the previously adopted provisions (which may not be 
subject to further negotiation or adaptation) but also 
preserves the consolidated version of the legislation. 
Obviously, in light of the length and complexity of the 
original Basel II framework, the resulting EU version is a 
highly burdensome piece of legislation (half of which is 
contained in the annexes), with no fewer than 146 articles.  
Further, it has proven difficult to keep the clear-cut 
structure of the original framework and to translate highly 
technical rules into a purely legal text. Given the growing 
level of complexity, implementing the new Directive will 
be a challenging exercise not only for banks but also for 
national supervisors. It would thus help them to have 
separate guidelines (which are not necessarily legislative 
texts), including rules by type of bank (standard versus 
IRB banks) and by type of business (retail, corporate, 
                                                        
4 An explanatory memorandum of less than 10 pages as 
compared to the lengthy legislation of some 400 pages points 
the “specific” EU measures but it does not provide a 
thorough explanation.  
5 Most importantly, these results do not take into account the 
endorsement of the new treatment of expected and 
unexpected losses, See Ayadi & Resti (2004).  
6 The recasting technique (Interinstitutional Agreement 
2002/C 77/01 allows the addition of new provisions to the 
existing legislation in grey. These sections should be 
negotiated and amended under the co-decision procedure, 
whereas the pre-existing white text is not amendable. Any 
text that is no longer valid is simply deleted.  
mortgage or trading, etc). In this respect, the CEBS has a 
key role in ensuring comprehensive rules are developed 
and consistently implemented across jurisdictions.  
Third, the Commission has not been explicit as to whether 
the CRD is a ‘Lamfalussy directive’
7 in a strict sense. On 
the one hand it has pushed for the creation of the 
Lamfalussy committees: the European Banking 
Committee (EBC) (level 2) established by Commission 
Decision 2004/10/EC and the CEBS (level 3) established 
by Commission Decision 2004/5/EC. On the other hand it 
has been very vague about what it considered to be either 
the principles or the detailed technical measures. 
Intuitively, one might think that the CRD is a kind of 
Lamfalussy directive and consider the articles as the 
principles, with the central rules governing the new 
provisions introduced by the new regulation and the 
annexes being the detailed, technical implementing 
measures. Therefore, in theory one could have expected 
that only the principles contained in the articles would be 
passed under co-decision procedures and all the 
provisions contained in the annexes would be the task of 
the committees.  
Yet in reality, the revision of the CRD has not followed 
the typical Lamfalussy procedure given that the full 
document (articles and annexes) has been driven through 
the co-decision legislative process. The CRD only applies 
the delegation of powers of some implementing measures 
to the EBC (level 2) and the CEBS (level 3) under the 
comitology procedure. These measures are referred to 
explicitly in Arts. 150 and 42 of the Directive proposal. 
The further evolution of the more risk-selective capital 
adequacy rules will be handled by the CEBS, whose main 
task is to advise on the implementing measures of the 
CRD and then to report their findings to the EBC, which 
will in turn decide whether or not to adopt them.  
In this process, only the Council can block proposals to be 
adopted under the comitology procedure. Indeed, 
according to the 1999 Council Decision (1999/468/EC) 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, only 
the Council has the right to act by qualified majority in a 
period that does not exceed three months on the proposal 
of measures agreed at level 2. The European Parliament; 
however, does not enjoy the same right. In fact, its limited 
role in the Lamfalussy process and in the comitology 
provisions in the CRD is the source of some discontent 
among MEPs. Although the European Constitution 
addresses Parliament’s concern about ensuring 
democratic accountability in the comitology procedure in 
Art. 36, the pause for reflection on the Constitution after 
                                                        
7 In theory, the Lamfalussy procedure means that legislative 
measures are drafted by subdividing the measures into 
principles (level 1) and technical implementing measures 
(level 2). The principles are adapted using the co-decision 
procedure (between the European Council and Parliament) 
and the implementing measures are adapted using the 
comitology process (between the EBC and the CEBS).  4 | RYM AYADI 
 
the French and Dutch referenda has placed the issue in 
abeyance.  
In response, the European Parliament temporarily 
suspended the comitology provisions in the CRD
8 until a 
new inter-institutional agreement can be reached that 
establishes its call-back right.  
What are the scenarios for CRD adoption?  
Throughout the process, the European Parliament has 
generally been supportive of the CRD and it seems that 
the majority of its members do not want to see further 
delays in its implementation despite the short time 
allocated to them to review this large and far-reaching 
piece of legislation.
9 Nevertheless, in the legislative battle 
to win the call-back right, Parliament has held the CRD 
comitology provisions hostage. In these circumstances, 
delays appear inevitable if the adoption of the 
Commission’s proposal requires a second reading.  
Further, this situation has created broader uncertainties 
that go beyond the CRD adoption. Parliament is strongly 
committed to obtaining its call-back right and is using the 
CRD as a critical bargaining chip in the negotiations.  
The ideal solution would be to reach a horizontal inter-
institutional agreement, before the plenary session meets 
late in September, which would extend the powers of the 
European Parliament in line with the powers granted in 
the Constitution in the context of comitology. If this 
agreement materialises, the comitology provisions in the 
CRD will not be at risk and the adoption process will not 
be pushed towards a second reading. This agreement 
should aim at amending the 1999 Council agreement. 
Against this background, meeting the September date
10 is 
unlikely given that the negotiations would have to start 
within the UK presidency with an objective of finding an 
agreement in the course of 2006.  
To meet the target date of the plenary session, another 
informal agreement will have to be explored to give 
Parliament the call-back right. Yet this solution depends 
greatly on the will, commitment and comfort-level of the 
majority of MEPs, as well as on an accurate and 
                                                        
8 When voting upon the amendments on 13 July 2005 in the 
plenary session of the European Parliament Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), a majority of the 
members voted for the suspension of the comitology 
provisions introduced in the CRD proposal.  
9 On 24 May 2005, Rapporteur Alexander Radwan presented 
the final report containing some 887 amendments (based on 
the European Commission’s proposal and after the Council’s 
political agreement in December 2004), of which 288 were 
his own. Prior to the 13 July vote on the amendments by the 
ECON Committee, some compromise amendments were 
presented aiming at decreasing the original number of 
amendments and hence easing the voting process. The 
majority of the amendments were passed.  
10 The plenary session is scheduled for the end of September 
2005. 
convincing message being transmitted by the Commission 
and the Council.  
Consequently, several different scenarios are plausible. If 
no formal agreement is reached by the September plenary 
but the Commission and Council reach an informal 
agreement with Parliament to extend its powers in the 
comitology context, then the likelihood that the CRD with 
the comitology provisions will be adopted at the first 
reading is very high.  
If Parliament is not satisfied with an informal agreement, 
however, then two other possibilities can be foreseen – 
either the CRD will be adopted at the first reading without 
the comitology provisions or the CRD will be pushed 
towards a second reading while a new inter-institutional 
agreement is sought in the course of 2006. If the CRD is 
adopted without comitology, then the relevance of the 
CEBS and the EBC in the CRD process is questionable. 
Moreover, if any changes (recalibration and updates, etc.) 
to the Directive are required after the fifth Quantitative 
Impact Study (QIS-5) – due to be initiated by the Basel 
Committee and the Commission Services in the second 
half of 2005 – then short amending directives will follow 
the traditional, lengthy, legislative co-decision process. 
In short, the CRD cannot be dispossessed of the 
comitology provisions for three reasons:  
•  First, given the high level of the Directive’s 
technicality, it is advisable to delegate some 
responsibility for the details to an expert committee 
subject to oversight by the co-legislators.  
•  Second, it is important to retain flexibility in the 
Directive since it has to be able to keep pace with 
developments in industry practices, markets and 
supervisory needs.  
•  Third, as one of the objectives of the Commission is 
to ensure enhanced convergence of regulatory and 
supervisory practices to help develop a single market, 
the role of the CEBS in this process is crucial. As 
noted above, the suspension of the comitology 
provisions will put a question mark over the future of 
CEBS’ role in the CRD.  
The new trading book rules: Adding to the 
complexity of the puzzle… 
Since the beginning of the revision process, the Basel 
Committee has insisted that the new framework should 
keep pace with ongoing developments in industry 
practices and build on an active public consultation. 
When the revised framework for credit and operational 
risks was finalised in June 2004, the Basel Committee had 
already set up a joint Working Group with IOSCO in 
January 2004, aiming at revising the treatment of 
counterparty credit risk (CCR),
11 a number of trading 
                                                        
11 CCR is the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could 
default before the final settlement of the transaction cash 
flows (see Bank for International Settlements, 2005b). THE NEW CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS DIRECTIVE | 5 
 
book-related issues as well as the treatment of double-
default. 
The resulting framework, which was based on extensive 
industry contributions and consultations,
12 was finalised 
on 18 July 2005.  
In parallel, the Commission consulted with the Working 
Group on the Basel/IOSCO review, strongly stressing that 
they would not diverge from the text agreed by the 
international regulators. The Commission Services are 
now preparing a set of amendments to the current CRD 
proposal for the purpose of incorporating the Working 
Group’s review into the legislation and enabling its 
implementation at the same time as the rest of the 
Directive. The amendments are mainly expected to 
modify the annexes of the CRD.  
The Basel II/IOSCO Working Group set up three 
subgroups that looked at amending the regulatory 
treatment of:  
1)  counterparty credit risk for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives and securities financing transactions 
(SFTs)
13 (strand 1 of the review);  
2)  double-default effects of hedged transactions in the 
banking and the trading books and short-term 
maturity adjustments in the IRB approach (strand 2); 
and  
3)  unsettled and failed transactions along with the 
boundary between trading and banking books and 
specific risk (strand 3).  
Importantly, the review seeks to deliver a consistent 
regulatory treatment of economically similar products 
(derivatives and SFTs), enabling cross-product netting
14 
                                                        
12 The industry was very active in the revision process and 
responded to the consultations launched by the Basel/IOSCO 
Working Group and the European Commission on 27 May 
2005. A joint industry response was prepared for the 
Basel/IOSCO Working Group by the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), the London Investment Banking 
Association (LIBA), the Bond Market Association (TBMA), 
the Futures and Options Association (FOA), the International 
Banking Federation (IBFed) and the British Banking 
Association (BBA). Further, LIBA, ISDA and FBE 
(Fédération Bancaire Européenne) commented separately on 
the Commission’s consultation.  
13 SFTs are transactions such as re-purchase agreements, 
reverse re-purchase agreements, security lending and 
borrowing and margin-lending transactions, where the value 
of the transactions depends on market valuations and the 
transactions are often subject to margin agreements (see 
Bank for International Settlements, 2005b). 
14 Cross-product netting refers to the inclusion of 
transactions of different product categories within the same 
‘netting set’. A netting set is a group of transactions with a 
single counterparty that are subject to a legally-enforceable 
bilateral netting arrangement and for which netting is 
recognised for regulatory capital purposes (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2005b). 
of current and future exposures and ensuring a level 
playing field for all dealers in these products, whether 
banks or investment firms.  
Overall, the review is a step forward towards a modern 
and more economically viable treatment for these 
complex products.  
In the field of counterparty risk, the changes put forward 
better reflect market practices. Indeed, the use of expected 
positive exposure (EPE)
 15 was considered to be an 
adequate measure to estimate the exposure at default 
(EAD),
 16 despite the amendments
17 brought to the 
concept by the regulators to account for the roll-over
18 of 
positions. 
Yet further refinements ought to be brought to the 
operational requirements for EPE modelling, some of 
which are viewed as too prescriptive,
19 particularly the 
floor imposed on own alpha estimates (which is now set 
equal to 1.2).
20 Further, the imposition of regulatory 
                                                        
15 EPE is the weighted average over time of expected 
exposures in which the weights are the proportion that an 
individual expected exposure represents over the entire time 
interval. When calculating the minimum capital 
requirements, the average is taken over the first year or over 
the time period of the longest maturity contract on the 
netting set. This concept was originally worked out by the 
industry (ISDA, LIBA and TBMA, 2004). 
16 EPE has two limitations: it does not account for the 
concentration of the portfolio or the correlation between the 
exposures to different counterparties. Wilde (2001) shows 
that for a perfectly diversified portfolio of counterparty 
exposures, EPE is a correct measure of EAD. But reality is 
different and portfolios are not perfectly diversified since 
they have credit and market risk granularities. To correct this 
concept and account for the granularity risk, Picoult (2002) 
defined an alpha multiplier, which is a ratio between the 
economic capital under market and credit uncertainty and 
economic capital calculated based on EPE.  
17 The solution proposed by the regulators is to use the 
effective EPE defined as the weighted average over time of 
effective expected exposure over the first year, or over the 
time period of the longest maturity contract in the netting set 
where the weights are the proportion that an individual 
expected exposure represents over the entire time interval: 
effective EPEt = Max (eff EPEt-1, EPE).  
18 The rollover risk is the amount by which the EPE is 
understated when future transactions with a counterpart are 
expected to be conducted on an ongoing basis, but the 
additional exposure generated by those future transactions is 
not included in the calculation of EPE.  
19 When calculating the alpha multiplier, several issues 
remain to be worked out such as accounting for the market 
characteristics, the differentiation between counterparty 
exposures, the floor of the internally calculated alpha and the 
default value for banks that choose not to calculate the alpha 
multiplier (α).  
20 Canabarro (2002) developed a quantitative model to 
represent a portfolio of market-driven counterparty 
exposures with parameters defining various characteristics of 6 | RYM AYADI 
 
treatment (usually applied to transactions considered with 
a maturity of over one year) on short-dated transactions 
(SFTs such as repo and securities lending transactions, 
which are collateralised transactions with a liquidation 
period broadly equal to five days), needs to be revisited 
since these transactions do not generally reach a maturity 
of one year. Also, the conditional recognition
21 of cross-
product netting has been criticised by the industry in view 
of recent changes in the US bankruptcy law and of the 
long-recognised enforceability of cross-product netting in 
other key jurisdictions.  
With respect to the treatment of double-default, there 
have been efforts to improve the current regulatory 
treatment of credit mitigation through the purchase of 
credit derivatives or guarantees, a process that is based on 
the substitution approach. This approach is deemed to be 
overly conservative since the double-default of both the 
reference entity (obligor) and the protection provider must 
occur within a short time interval and it ignores double 
recovery. A new approach based on the asymptotic single 
risk factor (ASRF) model was put forward by the 
international regulators. This approach introduces a 
separate risk factor that affects the reference entity and 
the protection provider.  
Because of this extra factor, hedged exposures are 
sensitive to three correlation parameters: ρ0S, the 
correlation between the reference name and the 
systematic factor (this factor is already calibrated within 
the revised framework of June 2004); ρgs, the correlation 
between the guarantor and the systematic factor; and the 
pair-wise correlation ρog. The final calibrations were set at 
ρgs = 0.7 and ρog = 0.5. These values correspond to the 
median values observed in the empirical studies.  
Since these values only represent average values, it is 
important to consider revising them when the new rules 
are due to be tested in the future. Further, it is important 
to reconsider the short-term maturity
22 (of less than one 
year) benefits at a later date when more reliable evidence 
is gathered. At this stage, it is imperative to maintain a 
constructive dialogue between regulators and industry 
representatives, which should continue beyond the 
adoption of the review measures, to ensure that the rules 
                                                                                                
the portfolio. With that model, Canabarro calculated α’s by 
using Monte Carlo simulations. Wilde (2002) derived the 
analytical expressions for α for the model. Fleck & Wilde 
(2004) extended the model to incorporate systematic, wrong-
way risk. The results of the model were validated with 
calculations of α  in real portfolios of major derivatives 
dealers. These results showed that α converges to 1.1. ISDA 
proposed setting its value to 1.2. The use of credit derivative 
swaps may lead to the increase of the value of α. 
21 The cross-border netting recognition is subject to a 
consensus among international regulators.  
22 Basel II sets out the scope of transactions eligible for 
short-term maturity in paras. 321 and 322, both of which are 
subject to national discretion.  
are updated and adapted to keep pace with market 
developments and evolving risk-management practices.  
Further improvements have been proposed to the trading 
book regime including the clarification of the types of 
exposures that qualify for the trading book (such as 
securitisation pipelines and investment in non-financial 
assets). The ultimate intention, however, is to achieve a 
risk-sensitive treatment of the items included in the 
trading book. In this regard, the Working Group 
introduced some changes that relate to the specific risk 
modelling. These changes are designed to update the rules 
in line with the developments in industry practices and the 
growth of complex and less liquid positions in the 
institutions’ trading books. Changes include a specific 
requirement under pillar 1 to incorporate the results of a 
firm’s stress test into their pillar 2 internal capital 
assessment. Further, firms will be required to capture 
default and event risk if they want to receive specific risk-
model recognition. Finally, with respect to the failed 
trades and non-DvP
23 (delivery versus payment) 
transactions, the new measures aim at setting out a 
uniform treatment for various types of unsettled 
transactions as current global standards differ. The 
measures also distinguish between DvP and non-DvP 
transactions as well as those with normal and longer 
settlement periods, and set the corresponding risk 
multipliers based on the settlement period. Obviously, 
capital requirements for these types of transactions are 
expected to increase, which is not necessarily pleasant for 
the industry players. At the same time, the measures 
encourage institutions to develop, implement and improve 
systems for tracking and monitoring credit-risk exposures 
arising from unsettled transactions.  
Overall, the changes brought by the trading book review 
are a significant step forward to better management of the 
risks stemming from these complex and growing 
activities. Therefore, the framework has allowed for the 
degree of flexibility necessary for further improvement in 
the future. Indeed, to continue the process of evolutionary 
adaptation of the regulatory framework, it is important for 
the rules to provide firms with the flexibility needed to 
improve their risk-management practices. As markets 
develop for offloading new forms of risk, it will be 
possible for the regulators and industry to recalibrate the 
regulatory model based on new, more extensive and better 
quality data.   
In this respect, it is vital to give firms the time necessary 
to undertake further reliable research in cooperation with 
the regulators, to ensure a sensible regulatory treatment 
overall. Too much prescription at this stage would not be 
advisable, as it would stifle risk-management innovation 
and hinder the emergence of better practices. 
From the perspective of the EU process, these new rules 
are being updated by the Commission Services based on 
the changes implemented in the final draft published on 
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18 July. There will not be a final EU proposal per se, but 
the amending text (of approximately 42 pages) is 
expected to be included in the CRD (mainly in the 
annexes) as a package. This would mean that neither 
renegotiation nor further text amendments would be 
sought. And in the event that some market participants 
were to seek further amendments in the plenary, the 
package will simply not be adopted and the review would 
need to be transposed through a separate directive.  
All this obviously creates an even greater challenge to 
overcome the deadlock resulting from the ‘temporary’ 
suspension in July of the comitology provisions in the 
CRD.  
The need to keep the comitology provisions is 
underscored by the high level of complexity and 
technicality of the new trading book rules together with 
the banking book rules. They are also necessary in light of 
the expected frequency of recalibration and updates to 
keep pace with the development of industry practices. 
And the inclusion of the new trading book rules in the 
CRD is essential, since these rules are an integral part of 
the Basel II package and vital are in ensuring that trading 
book instruments are subject to appropriately risk-
sensitive capital treatments. As previously discussed, 
however, uncertainty is clouding the timely adoption of 
the Directive. Given that a second reading scenario is not 
excluded, a word of caution is needed: any delay in 
implementation could put EU financial institutions at a 
disadvantage  vis-à-vis  their non-EU competitors. It is 
therefore crucial that the new trading book rules are 
adopted together with the remainder of the CRD to 
protect the level playing field between EU firms and the 
rest of the world, and to ensure that the CRD is 
appropriate for application to both banking book and 
trading book exposures. 
Towards the adoption and implementation of 
the new CRD: Outstanding issues 
During Parliament’s reading process, specific issues have 
provoked strong lobbying from several interest groups to 
put forward certain changes. The outcome entailed, as 
noted earlier, some 288 amendments in April 2005, which 
were extended to 887 amendments in May 2005 proposed 
by the members of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON)
24. Thanks to the compromise 
amendments proposed by the Rapporteur, Alexander 
Radwan, these were reduced in July 2005. The remaining 
amendments were voted upon on 13 July 2005.
25  
Besides the heated comitology issue, several other issues 
were voted upon by the ECON Committee and reacted 
upon to seek for agreement by the Council.
26  
                                                        
24 European Parliament (2005b). 
25 See European Parliament (2005c). 
26 Some of the 150 amendments voted upon in the ECON in 
July have not necessarily been agreed by the Council. An 
agreement between the two institutions is to be reached 
The main issues, which require careful assessment now 
along with continuous revision in the future, are: 
•  the level at which supervision is to apply – solo entity 
versus consolidated application (Art. 69 re-casting 
2000/12/CE); 
•  the role of the lead supervisor (Art. 129 re-casting 
2000/12/EC);  
•  intra-group exposure (Art. 80(7) (re-casting 
2000/12/EC); and  
•  the disclosure of ratings to loan applicants (Art. 145 
(3) re-casting 2000/12/EC);  
Each of these is considered in detail below. 
The level at which supervision is to apply – 
Solo entity versus consolidated application 
Art. 68(1) of the Commission’s proposal (the solo entity 
rule) stipulates that every credit institution (the parent 
undertaking
27 and each subsidiary
28) shall comply with 
the application of capital requirements on an individual 
basis. This solo requirement also applies to pillar 2 and 
for significant subsidiaries to pillar 3.  
Art. 69 allows, under very strict conditions and with the 
approval of the supervisors, the waiver of the solo 
requirement. This implies that for national subsidiaries it 
is possible to supervise them on a consolidated basis (for 
adequate capital allocation and application of the 
supervisory review and disclosure requirements at a group 
level). Art. 69 also allows, under similarly strict 
conditions and with additional disclosure requirements, 
supervisors to waive the solo requirement for parent 
undertakings.  
In compromise amendment B, part 2,
29 it was proposed 
that the application of the waiver be extended to the 
national parent undertaking, together with the national 
subsidiaries, which allows for the supervision of national 
subsidiaries and the parent undertaking at a consolidated 
level. This treatment clearly disadvantages banks 
operating through subsidiaries across borders and benefits 
banks operating nationally.  
The industry has been pushing for supervision at a 
consolidated level. For the time being, this is deemed to 
be very unlikely since there are still legal impediments to 
the application of such supervision: fragmented legal 
structures for prudential supervision, different deposit 
                                                                                                
before the new Directive is voted upon in the plenary session 
in late September.  
27 A parent undertaking is defined in Arts. 1 and 2 of 
Directive 83/349/EEC.  
28 A subsidiary undertaking is defined in Arts. 1 and 2 of 
Directive 83/349/EEC. National subsidiaries are those that 
are established in the home country of the bank. EU 
subsidiaries are those that are established in countries other 
than the home country of the bank.  
29 See European Parliament (2005c). 8 | RYM AYADI 
 
guarantee schemes, the role of lender of last resort and 
liquidity management, etc.  
A transitional alternative could be the application of 
supervision at a consolidated level (national, EU 
subsidiaries and parent undertakings) at the discretion of 
the national authorities and with the consent of the host 
authorities during a transitional period and for specific 
cases.  
Consequently, the review clause already voted upon under 
the compromise amendment L in July
30 is certainly highly 
welcomed.  
The role of the lead supervisor  
Art. 129 of the CRD empowers the consolidating (or lead) 
supervisor, which is usually based in the home country of 
the bank, to have a decisive role in model authorisation at 
a group level (with respect to the validation and final 
shape of the IRB and AM models for credit and 
operational risks). This is only a first step towards a lead 
supervisor regime; this partial application risks 
inconsistencies in implementation since this concept is 
not extended to pillars 2 and 3 of the CRD. For this 
reason, the industry has strongly advocated the extension 
of the provisions of Art. 129 to pillars 2 and 3, to reduce 
the multiplicity of the regulatory requirements in the 
different jurisdictions where the financial groups operate.  
This move would give more powers to home supervisors 
over the host in the supervisory review and evaluation 
process. It may, however, raise some asymmetries with 
respect to the involvement of the host supervisor, as the 
latter has responsibility for financial stability and liquidity 
management issues in its own country and is accountable 
to local taxpayers if a banking failure occurs. From a 
financial stability standpoint, a complete lead supervisory 
regime may not be acceptable unless there is a binding 
agreement between the home and host supervisors with 
respect to the issues of deposit guarantee schemes, lender 
of last resort and reorganisation and winding-up.  
In this respect, the follow-up recommendations of the 
European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR) in June 
2005 support the lead-supervisor concept if it is 
complemented by the establishment of a so-called 
‘college of supervisors’, which would include, at a 
minimum, representatives of the supervisory authorities 
of those countries where the institution has substantial 
operations.
31 In parallel, the EFR recommendations gave 
sensible solutions for supervisory cooperation in 
situations of crisis and the issues of lender of last resort, 
deposit insurance / insurance guarantees in an 
environment in which there is a lead supervisor. These 
recommendations should be further explored to ensure an 
                                                        
30 European Parliament (2005c).  
31 In its follow-up recommendations, the EFR (2005) warns: 
“It is absolutely clear that the lead supervisor concept cannot 
operate without this interaction; hence this should be 
considered an essential part of the concept.” 
efficient supervisory cooperation and coordination. The 
role of the CEBS was also considered as paramount for a 
higher degree of cooperation and transparency between 
the home and host supervisors and for fostering a 
consistent and coherent implementation and application of 
EU banking regulation in all member states.  
These recommendations have already been considered by 
the Commission in its recent initiative in July 2005 to 
revise the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 
(94/19/EC), with a view to assessing the adequacy of the 
minimum coverage level of such schemes and to explore 
whether and to what extent additional features of the 
schemes should be further harmonised.  
Since the lead-supervisor concept has not yet fully 
materialised, the European Parliament has sensibly 
backed the non-extension of Art. 129 to pillars 2 and 3 for 
the time being,
32 but foresees some changes in the 
direction of strengthening the role of the consolidating 
supervisor in the future, as it has called for a re-
examination of the provisions of this article under the 
review clause requirement.  
In conclusion and in support of the EFR 
recommendations, the lead supervisor concept 
complemented by a college of supervisors should be seen 
as a positive step towards a more efficient and effective 
prudential supervisory structure in the EU.  
The intra-group exposures  
Art. 80(7) of the CRD allows banking groups to apply a 
risk weight of zero to some exposures between the parent 
and its subsidiaries within a single country and among the 
individual subsidiaries also located there. But this is only 
allowed as an exemption at the discretion of the national 
authorities and if certain stringent conditions are met. 
As stipulated in the Commission’s Directive proposal, 
these conditions are:  
a)  “the counterparty is an institution or a financial 
holding company, financial institution, asset 
management company or ancillary services 
undertaking subject to appropriate prudential 
requirements”;  
b)  “the counterparty is included in the same 
consolidation as the credit institution on a full 
basis”;  
c)  “the counterparty is subject to the same risk 
evaluation, measurement and control procedure 
as the credit institution”;  
d)  “the counterparty is established in the same 
Member State as the credit institution”; 
e)  “there is no current or foreseen material or legal 
impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds 
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or repayment of liabilities from the counterparty 
to the credit institution”.  
Otherwise, these intra-group exposures must be risk-
weighted by at least 20% for credit risk.  
It is important to note that large banks have generally 
centralised group risk-management, mostly organised 
along business lines irrespective of their geography. 
Requiring a risk weighting for intra-group exposures 
could be not realistic since the default history among 
group companies is almost nonexistent – default rarely 
occurs when lending within the same group. Building 
upon this approach, it is natural to defend the extension of 
the zero-risk weighting of intra-group exposures to sister 
subsidiaries in the same member state and in all member 
states. Therefore, allowing this extension to cross-border 
subsidiaries is an important issue to be considered in the 
future.  
In the meanwhile, it is important to ensure the risk quality 
of these entities at all levels (national or EU), to allow the 
extension of the zero-risk weighting. In this respect, the 
Commission was prudent in setting in its proposal a list of 
requirements a bank must fulfil before it can benefit from 
this treatment at this stage. 
Nevertheless, the diversity of banking markets in Europe 
shows that conflicting interests can arise.  
There has been an active and vociferous debate to extend 
zero-risk weighting to institutions that are members of the 
same institutional protection scheme. In Germany, for 
example, where savings and cooperative banks operate 
under this scheme, a failing bank is supported by others in 
the scheme and in particular to ensure their liquidity and 
solvency. However, some of these institutions are 
unlikely to meet the requirements set in the Commission’s 
proposal in particular criteria (b) and (c). 
It is important to mention the fundamental difference 
between the zero-risk weighting of intra-group exposures 
and the zero weighting of lending among institutions 
covered by protection schemes. The status of being 
covered by a protection scheme would not by itself 
suffice to extend the zero-risk weights to intra-group 
exposures as opposed to banks fulfilling the list of 
requirements proposed by the Commission’s Directive 
proposal. The ECON Committee’s proposal of 13 July
33 
concerning the qualification of liability agreements on the 
protection of institutions and the risk-monitoring 
requirements has been more lenient on the treatment of 
such counterparties. Indeed, to qualify for the extension of 
the zero-risk weighting, the counterparty has to fulfil only 
three criteria: (a), (d) and (e) out of the five set in the 
Commission’s proposal, plus several other criteria that are 
related to the institution’s part of an institutional 
protection scheme. If these criteria were to be considered 
insufficient to qualify as a single unit for prudential 
purposes, this may cast doubt over the equivalent 
                                                        
33 See European Parliament (2005c). 
treatment of other institutions that are not members of 
these schemes.  
The Presidency compromise
34 of Art. 80 (7a) provided 
further changes to the criteria to be fulfilled by this type 
of institution as compared to those proposed by the 
ECON. The main changes concerned the annual reporting 
and the risk evaluation, measurement and control 
procedures.  
It is important to ensure an equivalent treatment of 
institutions that are managing the same risks regardless of 
their different nature. Towards that end, the new criteria 
to be fulfilled by the institutions as part of any protection 
scheme should be equivalent or partly equivalent to 
criteria (b) and (c). Allowing for preferential treatment to 
one or another group would cast a dubious light over the 
evenness of the playing field.  
The disclosure of ratings to loan applicants 
There have been discussions about further regulating the 
disclosure of banks’ rating decisions to individual 
applicants for loans. In fact, this was specifically debated 
in the context of increasing transparency and 
communication between SMEs and their lenders. 
Art. 145(3) of the Commission’s proposal explicitly 
requires banks to adopt a formal policy to comply with 
the disclosure requirements set by the new Directive. It 
was very vague, however, with respect to the disclosure 
of rating decisions to loan applicants.  
Amendment X of Art. 145(3) in the ECON proposal
35 
calls on banks to voluntarily disclose their rating 
decisions to individual applicants for loans; otherwise, 
there should be further national legislation in this respect. 
The Presidency compromise
36 kept the main provisions of 
this amendment, with a slight change calling on banks to 
disclose their lending decisions only if requested by 
SMEs and other corporate applicants. In principle, this 
amendment favours SMEs and other corporate applicants 
who are aware of the possibility to obtain further 
explanations of a bank’s decision to extend credit and also 
the recourse to national measures. However, the 
amendment does not sufficiently explain the national 
measures to be taken if the bank abstains from giving the 
adequate explanation.  
Yet, if the intention is to not to overwhelm banks with 
extra national regulations, one has first to look at what 
should and should not be disclosed, the format, the 
comprehensibility and relevance of the information 
disclosed, etc. 
For example, owing to the complexity of the lending 
process which is highly linked to the rating process 
nowadays (the quantitative process involving historical 
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data collection, analysis of individual factors and 
statistical procedures to obtain the rating classes and the 
associated probabilities of default), explaining the 
detailed process to clients is deemed to be not only 
burdensome for the bank, as it implies mobilising extra 
human resources to explain the process,
37 but also for 
clients, who may not be interested in learning about the 
whole rating process, notably if this would result in an 
extra cost involved in the banking service they receive.  
Moreover, in the event that banks voluntarily disclose 
individual ratings and since the application of different 
risk-management approaches (standardised versus IRB 
approaches) would lead to different capital charges for the 
same borrowers’ quality,
38 it is very likely that informed 
SMEs would shop around to obtain the best assigned 
banking rating.
39 Undoubtedly, the SMEs would prefer a 
higher bank rating irregardless of whether their effective 
quality implies a lower rating. This may lead to a 
competitive disadvantage for banks that should normally 
be rewarded for their use of more sensitive risk-
management techniques.  
In sum, it is important to involve SMEs in the decision-
making process to grant credit by giving them an 
overview without disclosing strategic information that 
could be negatively manipulated to the banks’ 
disadvantage. This overview could, for example, include 
the key variables and factors that have a strong 
explanatory power to derive the probability of default and 
the loss-given default. This approach would be very 
helpful to understanding why a credit application is 
accepted or rejected. The relevant information should also 
be accessible either on the bank’s website or elsewhere to 
make sure that applicants can access it and increase their 
credit application’s probability of success. 
A firm and voluntary EU code of conduct could work 
better in this respect than further national regulations as 
being proposed by Parliament – which at best will be 
divergent and create even more burdens for banks. A non-
legislative EU code of conduct would serve as a 
framework for setting out the main principles for the 
credit-rating disclosure process. Industry should be 
consulted on the code-of-conduct principles, which would 
then be agreed upon and implemented by the member 
states. 
Conclusions 
Despite its complexity and high level of technicality, the 
new CRD is a step forward towards more risk-based 
banking regulation. The Commission has achieved a far-
reaching piece of legislation due to be applied from the 
                                                        
37 The banking agent who deals with the company is not 
necessarily the person who assigns the ratings and calculates 
the probabilities of default; further, s/he is not necessarily 
qualified to understand the whole rating process.  
38 See Ayadi & Resti (2004). 
39 In extreme cases this may lead to manipulation and fraud. 
end of 2006 to all credit institutions and investment firms 
in the 25 member states.  
The inclusion of the new trading book rules into the CRD 
is essential to ensure that trading book instruments are 
subject to appropriate risk-sensitive capital treatment. But 
at the same time, flexibility is required to allow any 
adaptation of these rules when the results of the impacts 
studies are to be available. 
Therefore, to ensure the success of its implementation, the 
CRD should not be dispossessed of the comitology 
provisions. These are essential for allowing flexible 
updates and changes related to the continuous 
development in market practices.  
The related role of the CEBS is key to a consistent and 
coherent implementation and application of EU banking 
regulation in all member states. Putting comitology 
provisions at risk implies a step backwards in banking 
regulation; in turn, this would cast serious doubts over the 
successful implementation of the CRD.  
Further, owing to the evolving nature of banking 
regulation and supervision, it is fundamental to prepare 
the foundation for a more integrated financial market. 
Ensuring that the lead supervisor concept functions well 
in general and in the context of the CRD in particular is 
vital. Efforts in this direction would also solve the issues 
related to the levels of application – whether banking 
supervision can be conducted at a consolidated level or 
whether banks and their subsidiaries are to be supervised 
as solo entities in the medium term.  
In addition, providing the conditions for a level playing 
field is one of the chief objectives in the development of 
new banking regulation. Therefore, favouring one interest 
group over another is not acceptable as it undermines this 
principle.  
Finally, provisions in the CRD that promote transparency 
and better communication between SMEs and their 
lenders would be appreciated, but this should be done 
through a non-legislative code of conduct, which sets out 
the main principles governing this growing SME-banking 
relationship and also the details of the minimum 
requirements for the disclosed elements in the rating 
process.  
The new CRD is a revolution in prudential supervision, 
not only for EU financial institutions but also for EU 
supervisors, and their respective tasks are challenging. 
Putting all the key elements together – comprehensible 
legislation, adequate and flexible means to update it and a 
continuous impartial dialogue with the interested parties – 
will lay a firm cornerstone to successful implementation. 
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Postscript 
On Wednesday, 28 September 2005, the European 
Parliament adopted the CRD at first reading, including the 
package of amendments related to the trading book 
activities. The uncertainties that were clouding its timely 
adoption a few weeks ago were addressed in a last minute 
compromise reached between the European Commission, 
Council and Parliament. This compromise means that  the 
current comitology system – which largely excludes the 
European Parliament – can be used to implement and 
update the CRD for a maximum of two years (or until 1 
April 2008), after which time these powers may be 
renewed only with the agreement of the three institutions. 
In the meanwhile, there will be a revision of the 
comitology system used for such implementing 
provisions. 
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